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Abstract 
This report analyses the different factors which Portuguese companies consider when 
choosing a host country to locate a subsidiary of a financial nature. Data of Portuguese 
companies with subsidiaries was used to perform probit and OLS regressions to test 
significance of a number of variables. A sample of European countries was used to compare 
different variables. 
Introduction 
The topic of this thesis was chosen as part of completing an internship at UK Trade & 
Investment, specifically the Investments Team, which forms part of the British Embassy in 
Lisbon. Their main activity is to increase the flow of foreign direct investment to the UK by 
finding and supporting Portuguese companies who wish to internationalise to the UK..  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is “an activity in which an investor in one country obtains a 
lasting interest, and a significant influence on the management of, an entity in another 
country”.
i
 This activity can be measured in financial investment flows and stocks or ‘real’ 
activity of foreign affiliates in host countries. 
A significant factor in the choice of this topic, is that the Investment team’s key performance 
indicators are based on the number of new FDI projects which they support in their move to 
the UK in a financial year and not the overall value of investment flows as mentioned above.  
For this reason, the Investment team decided to focus on analysing the competitive 
advantages of setting up operational holdings, of a financial nature, for Portuguese companies 
in the UK. This objective is aligned with the wider objectives of UKTI HQ which has 
recently set up a new team fully dedicated to attracting EHQs to set up in the UK. 
The natural assumption is that financial holdings are based in those countries with the lowest 
corporate taxation rate in order to reduce costs. However, the literature review below 
demonstrates that this is not true and this thesis will attempt to answer the question of what 
other factors Portuguese companies consider when choosing a location for their financial 
holdings. 
Literature Review 
“Tax policies are obviously capable of affecting the volume and location of FDI, since, [...] 
higher tax rates reduce after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment 
funds”.
ii
 Studies have shown that a 1% increase in effective tax resulting in approximately 
3% decrease in the probability of investing in that country.
iii
 However, this is not true when 
reversed as FDI does not increase in the same proportion when effective tax rate is lowered. 
Ireland is further proof of this as it has a tax rate which is drastically lower than many other 
countries and yet, does not attract the largest FDI.  
Further to the question of tax, is that of stability. Investors want to feel secure in the future of 
their investment and of the ‘deal’ which they have entered into. It is no use offering a low tax 
rate if the investor has no faith that it will remain so.
iv
 Stability is also necessary when 
considering the political and economic nature of the destination country. This seems 
impossible in the current economic climate, and much worse in countries such as Portugal 
and Spain. However, there have also been cases of FDI flows having decreased in countries 
with very stable histories too as a result of the actions of regulatory authorities (such as the 
radical restructuring of some banking industries) triggering divestment in certain countries. 
The United Kingdom, ranked 33 out of 165 on the Political Stability Index
v
, is currently the 
preferred destination in Europe for foreign direct investment (FDI) with a probability of a 
project being based there at 22,6% according to the Office of Strategy and Studies at the 
Ministry of Economics.
vi
 However, this does not remain true for FDI in the form of holdings 
and other non-productive investments. In these cases, Holland, 21 out of 165, is favoured for 
investment funds and Luxembourg, 11 out of 165, for SGPS’. Ultimately, these countries are 
all in the top 20% of the world for stability. 
Labour costs seem to offset the negative impact of instability as we see a large increase in 
FDI in developing countries which tend to be less politically stable. In 2010, for the first 
time, developing countries absorbed more than half of global FDI.
vii
 Sethi et al (Sethi et al, 
2003) proposed that increased competition in a host country causes companies to seek 
efficiency by investing in countries with low wages, namely developing countries, to reduce 
costs.
viii
  
This issue is counter-balanced by proximity factors which are indicated by the fact that a 
large amount of FDI in the OECD area takes place between those countries with regional 
trade agreements and geographical proximity. This factor seems to have a reciprocal, yet 
complex, influence with an increase in foreign trade. The Gravity Model attempts to explain 
how location of origin (supply) and destination (demand) of trade along with certain 
characteristics of the individual responsible for the transfer determine the distribution of 
economic flows.
ix
 
Also considered in the Gravity Model are size and growth of the economy as these would for 
the market for the business. Although, Spain is a case against this because the probability of 
investment is 4,5% in comparison to Portugal’s 1,3% however the economy of Spain is six 
times the size of Portugal’s . Linked to this, are the leading sectors in a particular country as 
yet another decision factor. For example, the UK has made a strong statement in the creation 
of Tech City as a destination for all technological companies and investors while 
Luxembourg has a highly developed financial sector with a network of additional services for 
this sector.
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A further factor which rounds back to fiscal issues is that of the existence of Double Taxation 
Agreements (DTA) between the investing country and one of potential investment. These 
agreements protect investors from being taxed in both countries and give various forms of 
relief. Hamada (1996) and Musgrave (1969) found that exemption schemes specifically 
“enhanced FDI outflows to low-tax countries, because repatriated profits are then exempted 
from taxation”.
xi
 However, Talamo warns that this should be done cautiously as removing 
restrictions can have harmful consequences for the economy of the host country.
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Thus it is possible to see that previous literature confirms that the corporate income tax rate 
of a country is not the only relevant factor for companies when choosing a location in which 
to invest. 
The Nature of Portuguese Culture from an Investment Perspective 
It is important to consider the nature of Portuguese people when analysing the variables 
which they would consider important when choosing to locate a financial subsidiary outside 
of Portugal.  The attributes which they value as a culture would play a large part in this and 
thus, it is important to create a mental image of them.  
The following variables were created and studied by Emeritus Professor Geert Hofstede 
whose work in values in workplace culture resulted in the study of each country’s nature. He 
calls culture the “collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one 
group or category of people from another”.
xiii
  He has studied how values in the workplace 
are affected by culture and this has resulted in five dimensions which can be compared 
between countries.
xiv
 
Portugal’s score of 63 reflects that hierarchical distance is accepted and the more powerful 
the position, the more privileges it holds. The communication between ‘boss’ and ‘employee’ 
is not entirely open and it can be difficult to convey negative information. Portuguese 
employees would expect that the boss be shown utmost respect and would find it offensive to 
address him/her in an informal way. 
Portugal (along with Spain) is a not Individualist at all and their score of 27 indicates a 
Collectivist society. Emphasis is placed on responsibility and loyalty to the ‘group’ which 
includes family, extended family and extended relationships. A person’s reputation and 
behaviour carries much weight in the community and this includes a moral responsibility 
towards work colleagues. Business deals often result from the use of one’s network and 
connections to other people within one’s community. 
Linked to its Collectivist nature, is Portugal’s low Masculinity score of 31 where polarization 
is not well considered nor is excessive competitiveness appreciated. Their focus is more on 
‘working in order to live’ and consensus is important. Well-being is a concern and incentives 
are often free time or flexibility. 
Portugal is clearly uncomfortable with uncertainty with a score of 104. This indicates that it 
has very rigid codes of behaviour and is intolerant of unorthodox behaviour. Rules have great 
importance and value is placed on hard work, punctuality and security. Innovation may be 
resisted. There is a great need for security. 
These values are confirmed by its score of 30 for the final dimension indicating that it has a 
short term orientation culture. This emphasises traditions and social pressure with an 
impatience for results and a small propensity to save. It should be said though, that most 
Western societies have a short term orientation.
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Based on the above scores, we would expect Portuguese companies to be quite conservative 
when choosing a host country for their financial subsidiaries. This is as a result of their strong 
risk aversion but also due to the value that they place on more traditional work environments 
where the boss is clearly above his/her employees and innovation is not easily accepted. 
Formality and punctuality are appreciated.  
The expectation would be that the factors which are important to a Portuguese company when 
choosing a location for a financial subsidiary would be strongly linked to these values. 
Method for Measuring Decision-making Factors 
i. Data 
Data for companies and the location of their subsidiaries was taken from the SABI database 
available at Nova SBE’s library. This is a database of approximately 455 000 Portuguese 
companies with a variety of information available on them: financial, workforce, location, 
activities. 
Search requirements for the companies were as follows: 
» Portuguese companies 
» Which have subsidiaries that are companies of a financial nature 
» Which are based in a given (foreign) country where the Portuguese company is the 
Global Ultimate Owner. 
This wording was chosen specifically to ensure that we were considering Portuguese 
companies whose main base and ownership was in Portugal. This group was filtered to only 
include those that had subsidiaries of a financial nature in European. Thus, the data served to 
show what variables Portuguese companies consider when opening a subsidiary of a financial 
nature in another host country in Europe. 
Comparison countries which did not have subsidiaries were chosen based on their 
membership of the European Union and European Economic Community with the criterion 
of having all the necessary data available. The only country which did not meet this criterion 
was Iceland. 
ii. Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with two lawyers who had had experience with transactions of 
this nature to gain a better understanding of the process and advice on what variables would 
be most relevant to the transaction. 
Mr Tiago Correia Moreira of Vieira de Almeida e Associados has advised those foreign 
companies who have opened subsidiaries in Portugal. Although this is the contrary situation 
to the subject of this thesis, the decision-making variables would be very similar and the 
conversation was valuable. The interview was conducted telephonically and Mr Moreira felt 
that there were four major issues that were considered by any company when deciding where 
to locate a subsidiary.  
These factors were: a) the opening costs of establishing a company in the host country, b) 
fiscal issues with regard to specific corporate tax rates, c) regulatory obligations for their 
specific sector and d) political stability of the country, particularly in the case of developing 
countries.  
The second interview was conducted with Mr Rui Camacho Palma of Linklaters on 6 
November 2012 at the Linklaters office in Lisbon. He has worked in both the UK and 
Portugal and thus, had interesting perspectives for both sides. The interview was extensive 
and covered two spheres; the first were the reasons (advantages and disadvantages) for 
entering the UK market specifically which were based around the flexibility that the UK law 
gives in certain choices when establishing a company there.  
Secondly, general considerations for companies when choosing a location for a financial 
subsidiary were discussed. The considerations are more relevant to this thesis and were: a) 
fiscal stability, b) ethical reputation of the country (corruption) and c) language. 
iii. Model and Variables 
The following model represents how the flow of FDI between a home country and a host 
country is based on relevant factors of both countries. Thus, the regressions performed 
answer how the choice of host country for a subsidiary of a financial nature is dependent on 
relevant variables in the home and host countries. The actual variables which were chosen are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
         
where:  
- Xij represents the flows between the home country i and the host country j 
- Yi and Yj: are the relevant factors of countries (i,j) which are listed below 
The following variables were chosen based on previous studies of a similar nature and the 
advice of the lawyers, Mr Moreira and Mr Palma. They are a mixture of traditional 
determinants of FDI such as corporate income tax rates and common language and other 
factors existing in the country of the subsidiary which may be stretching the traditional ambit 
of this type of study but nevertheless, could affect the decision-making process of the 
Portuguese company.  
1. Fiscal Stability: This value indicates how stable the corporate income tax rate is in a 
subsidiary location. This is important as parent companies want to be able to trust that 
their reasoning behind the decision will still be valid in the future and that they will 
not have to contend with new corporate income tax rates every year. This value was 
calculated as the variance on the corporate income tax rate per country over varying 
time periods in the last fifteen years from 1997 to 2011. The higher the variance, the 
more the country had indeed been changing its corporate income tax rates while a 
zero variance indicated complete stability in the corporate income tax rate. In this 
case, the variance was a result of countries lowering their corporate income tax rates 
as none raised it during this time. These values were taken from the Worldbank 
database
xvi
. {var15ect, var10ect, var5ect,var510, var1015, var010} 
Hypothesis 1: Variance on the corporate income tax rate will have a negative relationship 
with the likelihood of locating in a specific country. 
2. Double Taxation Agreement: This value is a dummy of 1 if a DTA exists between 
Portugal and that country, and 0 if no DTA exists between the two countries
xvii
. This 
is relevant because DTAs are bilateral agreements with other jurisdictions which 
allow the company to avoid being taxed both in the host country and in the country of 
origin by agreeing on special tax rates or credit in the country of origin for the value 
of corporate income tax rate paid in the host country. These rates are particularly 
relevant for capital gains and dividend income. They also serve to prevent tax evasion 
or exploitation of differing tax systems. {dta} 
Hypothesis 2: Existence of a DTA will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of 
locating in a specific country. 
3. GDP per capita: This variable is an indicator of the total output of a country by 
considering its gross domestic product and the number of people in that country. This 
is an indicator of the economic strength of a country. The average of this variable was 
considered with varying time frames over the fifteen years between 1997 and 2011. 
These values were taken from the Worldbank’s statistics on countries
xviii
. {ave15, 
ave10, ave5, ave1015, ave510, ave010} 
Hypothesis 3: Average GDP per capita will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of 
locating in a specific country. 
4. Corruption: This is an index value from Corruption Perception Index 2011 by 
Transparency International which ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt 
they are perceived to be. The index value was taken directly from the index with a 
value of 0 indicating no perceived corruption and the higher the value, indicating an 
increased level of perceived corruption. {corruption} 
Hypothesis 4: Perceived corruption will have a negative relationship with the likelihood of 
locating in a specific country. 
5. Economic Risk: This is an index value that shows the level of economic distress that 
the country is in. This variable is important to consider as it is often associated with 
political instability as is demonstrated by the fact that most countries which had had 
an outbreak of instability, had had a decline in GDP in the previous two years
xix
. 
{econrisk} 
Hypothesis 5: Economic risk will have a negative relationship with the likelihood of locating 
in a specific country. 
The following variables are based on the cultural dimensions of a country and describe the 
nature of the citizens of a country. These values have been included to determine whether 
companies are influenced by the similarity and/or aspiration to have the qualities of another 
country. The number attributed to a certain dimension only has value when compared to other 
countries is represented as an absolute value and also as a difference between that country’s 
value and Portugal’s value. 
6. Power distance: Value which indicates the “degree to which less powerful members 
of a society accept that power is distributed unequally”. This results in a very 
hierarchical work structure with less justification of actions. {pdi, difpdi} 
Hypothesis 6: Power distance will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of locating 
in a specific country. 
7. Individualism: This is a loosely knit society which focuses on having responsibility 
for yourself and immediate family only as opposed to collectivist societies which feel 
a responsibility to the ‘group’ and expect that loyalty in return. This society values the 
achievements of the individual instead of attributing them to the efforts of the group. 
{ind, difind} 
Hypothesis 7: Individualism will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of locating 
in a specific country. 
8. Masculinity: This indicates the preference of a society for heroism and material 
reward in return for success as opposed to a more feminine society which values 
cooperation and quality of life more. {mas, difmas} 
Hypothesis 8: Masculinity will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of locating in a 
specific country. 
9. Uncertainty Avoidance: This variable indicates the degree to which members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with ambiguity or uncertainty. In general, countries with 
high uncertainty avoidance do not deal well with the fact that the future is always 
uncertain and often hold onto rigid codes of behaviour and beliefs. They are often 
intolerant of people or cultures different than them. {uav, difuav} 
Hypothesis 9: Uncertainty avoidance will have a positive relationship with the likelihood of 
locating in a specific country. 
10. Long term Orientation: This value can be interpreted as a society’s attitude towards 
finding the truth. Those with a short-term orientation are focused on tradition and 
expect quick results with the ‘absolute Truth’ being established. Those societies with 
a long term orientation are more flexible and realise that change is both necessary and 
inevitable and thus, are more accepting of the idea that truth is based on situation and 
context. {lto, diflto} 
Hypothesis 10: Long term orientation will have a negative relationship with the likelihood of 
locating in a specific country. 
Limitations of the Data 
As in any study, there are limitations to the data that was available on Portuguese companies 
which had financial subsidiaries in other European countries. The database itself was bought 
in 2008 and updates were not complete.  
Further to this, the lack of a date of establishment for the subsidiaries in the database also 
made it difficult to match the correct time of the variable to each subsidiary. It is for this 
reason that both the corporate income tax rate and average of the GDP per capita over a 
certain time period had to be used. Using these measures, ensured that all the possibilities for 
the time period were considered. 
This was also necessary because FDI is considered to be a lagging indicator of the investment 
environment.
xx
 This is because investment flows in a particular year represent decisions and 
actions taken in months and years prior to that. This is because planning and funds take time 
to happen before the investment becomes a reality. Thus, FDI reflects the state of the 
investment environment previous to the year in which it actually happened. 
Results &Discussion 
The following regressions demonstrate two possible options for the decision-making process 
and the results show that different variables are found to be significant depending on the 
perspective of the Portuguese company.  
A. PROBIT: Binary outcome of locate/not locate for Portuguese companies with 
subsidiaries in European countries 
The first, a probit regression, demonstrates the variables considered when deciding whether 
or not to locate a subsidiary in a foreign country. This considers all European countries and 
has the perspective of a Portuguese company considering the establishment of a new financial 
subsidiary anywhere in Europe. The variables are those that the Portuguese company would 
consider from a ‘neutral’ perspective; that is, considering any European country regardless of 
whether there were already subsidiaries located there or not. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Stata Probit Regression Results 
 a b c d e 
Tax Variance 1997-2006 0.036 0.032 0.034 0.049 0.037 
 (2.36)* (1.90) (1.96)* (2.26)* (2.25)* 
Economic Risk 0.584 0.530 0.515 0.719 0.609 
 (2.03)* (1.81) (1.72) (2.18)* (1.80) 
Average GDP per capita 
1997-2011 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.07)* (1.96) (2.03)* (2.03)* (1.95) 
Tax Trend 1997-2006  0.048    
  (0.73)    
Masculinity   0.022   
   (1.37)   
Double Taxation 
Agreement 
   -1.380  
    (1.13)  
Corruption     0.031 
     (0.15) 
Constant -6.167 -7.368 -6.945 -1.380 -6.505 
 (2.36)* (2.28)* (2.40)* (1.13) (1.85) 
 
var010: The variance of the corporate income tax per country between 1997 and 2006 
There is a positive relationship with variance of the corporate income tax between 1997 and 
2006 which says that the greater the variance in corporate income tax in these years was, the 
more likely a Portuguese company was to locate there. The coefficient for variance of the 
corporate income tax between 1997 and 2006 is 0.03.  
This seems contrary to the belief that fiscal stability is an important factor for companies 
choosing to locate a subsidiary as stated in Hypothesis 1. It is even more surprising 
considering that Portuguese culture in general has an extremely high uncertainty avoidance 
score. One would expect that greater variability would in fact have the opposite effect and 
cause Portuguese companies to be less likely to locate a subsidiary in that host country. 
Though, one should consider trends in corporate income tax during this time period. The 
average variance in corporate income tax was highest in the years between 2007 and 2011 
(29,55 compared to 21,93 from 1997 to 2006) as a result of the increasingly competitive 
nature of corporate income taxes and the general trend of countries lowering their corporate 
income tax rates to increase inward FDI.  
Those countries which had a higher variance of corporate income tax between 1997 and 2006 
were those that were likely ‘ahead of the curve’ and had begun dropping their corporate 
income tax earlier than during the big rush between 2007 and 2011. Countries such as Italy, 
Netherlands and Poland dropped their corporate income tax rate by as much as 20% during 
this earlier time period. This drop in corporate income tax rates would have made them more 
attractive to Portuguese companies wanting to establish a financial subsidiary and explains 
why the higher variability during this time period, in fact made it more likely that a financial 
subsidiary be established there. 
This idea is similarly confirmed in the Financial Times article of January 2011: “Tax cut fails 
to woo foreign execs”.
xxi
 This article discusses how the lowering of corporate income tax in 
the United Kingdom has failed to make London a more attractive destination for inward 
investors. The main reason for this is that there are still jurisdictions such as Ireland, who 
dropped its corporate income tax rate to 12,5% in 2003, with lower corporate income tax 
rates. Ireland was clearly ‘ahead of the curve’ in the time period between 1997 and 2006 and 
was able to gain an advantage. The Portuguese companies which have taken advantage of this 
and opened financial subsidiaries in Dublin are Galp, Mota-Engil, Sonaecom, Jerónimo 
Martins, EDP and Cimpor.
xxii
 
The variance of the corporate income tax between 1997 and 2006 is significant at the 5% 
level. This variable is most strongly affected by the inclusion of the existence of a Double 
Taxation Agreement in the regression – this increases the coefficient which can be expected 
as DTA’s determine what rate of taxes will be paid in the host country. The masculinity of a 
country causes a slight drop in the coefficient. This could be that the value of a driven and 
work-oriented society could compensate for a varying tax rate in the eyes of the investor. Tax 
trend also drops the value of the coefficient of tax variance but this is likely because they are 
similar variables. 
econrisk: An index value for the economic risk of a country 
The variable for economic risk also has a positive relationship with the likelihood of locating 
a subsidiary. The coefficient of 0.58 tells us that the higher the economic risk of a country, 
the more likely that a subsidiary will be located in that country. This seems against rational 
thinking and, once again, particularly surprising for Portugal who is a country “defined by 
uncertainty avoidance”.
xxiii
 This coefficient seemingly disproves Hypothesis 5. 
But, one needs to consider that this regression is focussed purely on European countries and 
thus the economic risk needs to be considered relative to other European countries.  
That is to say, Europe has historically been perceived as economically safe (although this has 
changed in recent years) and thus the general idea of economic risk, should be considered in 
the context of relativity to other European countries. Netherlands, with an economic risk 
value of 6, demonstrates this concept because it is traditionally been considered an excellent 
destination for holdings companies and is not perceived to be an economically risky country. 
However, when being compared to countries such as Norway (economic risk value of 2), or 
Denmark (economic risk value of 4), Netherlands is relatively risky. 
Thus, the risk in this case does not equate to choosing a host country with the knowledge that 
that choice of host country may lead to a loss. It merely reflects that those countries which are 
attractive locations for financial subsidiaries are relatively more risky than other less 
attractive locations. However, they are still good destinations for a Portuguese company to 
locate a financial subsidiary. 
The economic risk of a country is significant at the 5% level. It is interesting to note that the 
inclusion of the corruption variable increases the coefficient of economic risk. This could be 
because economic risk is a more easily accepted problem than that of corruption. Economic 
risk is something uncontrollable whereas corruption is a deeper problem of certain societies. 
ave15: Average GDP per capita per country from 1997 to 2011 
There is a positive relationship between the likelihood of locating a subsidiary and the 
average Gross Domestic Product per capita of a country between 1997 and 2011. The 
positive coefficient of 0.00004 demonstrates that the greater the average GDP per capita from 
1997 to 2011, the more likely the location of a subsidiary. 
This is logical, and in keeping with Hypothesis 3, as the larger the value of all final goods and 
services produced within a country in a given year (divided by the average population for the 
same year) the greater the ability of a subsidiary to capitalise on that large market. 
This variable is significant at the 5% level. There no change brought to the value of the 
coefficient by including other variables in the regression. 
 
Figure 2: Normalised coefficient values for Probit 
PROBIT Coefficient Standard Deviation Normalised Value 
var010 0.034 28.54 0.001 
econrisk 0.564 1.47 0.38 
ave15 0.00004 17582.45 0.0000 
 
These values give us the ability to compare coefficients regardless of the fact that their initial 
values were different sizes and units. This demonstrates that economic risk in fact is the 
greatest variable to affect the decision of Portuguese investor when choosing a location for a 
subsidiary of a financial nature. 
The variables which were found to be significant in this probit regression demonstrate the 
importance of the concept of “soft power” as discussed in a Reuter’s analysis on ‘Confusing 
hard and soft power in emerging markets’.
xxiv
 The article discusses the importance of “soft 
power” which is described as those intangible characteristics of a country such as culture, 
social justice and transparency of law. It points out that if FDI was merely based on “raw data 
such as economic output”, then the gap between established and developing countries would 
be almost nothing.  However, this is not true and Dolan cites the large inequality and lag in 
“soft power” in developing countries. 
This “soft power” is evident in the significance of corporate income tax variance (which 
indicates stability of fiscal law) and economic risk for Portuguese companies when deciding 
whether or not to locate a financial subsidiary in a specific country. The mix of GDP per 
capita as a “hard power” with these two other “soft powers” demonstrates why the traditional 
destinations for FDI have maintained their position ahead of the threat of growing developing 
economies. 
B. OLS: Of those European countries with subsidiaries, the likelihood of a Portuguese 
company locating in a certain country based on the variables discussed above 
The second regression goes further, and demonstrates the important variables when 
considering the countries which have a subsidiary located in them. This regression considers 
the ‘bandwagon’ effect which is a form of groupthink behaviour that says that conduct or 
beliefs spread among people (or companies).  
Thus, companies will be more attracted to those host countries where they have seen their 
competitors succeed or where there are already established positive beliefs. This regression 
compares those countries that have a Portuguese subsidiary located within them and attempts 
to determine the variables on which these countries need to differentiate themselves. 
Figure 3: Stata OLS Output Table 
 
 
 
 
 
The R-squared value indicates the extent to which the variation in the number of subsidiaries 
located in a host country (y variable) can be attributed to the variance of the corporate income 
tax rate between 1997 and 2011 and the existence of a Double Taxation Treaty (x variables). 
In this case, the R-squared of 0.3715 indicates that 37,15% of the choice of where to locate a 
financial subsidiary is based on corporate income tax variation and the existence of a DTA.  
The value for Adjusted R-squared indicates whether the addition of another variable increases 
the explanatory power of the model. The closeness of the values of R-squared (37,15%) and 
Adjusted R-squared (31,68%) indicate that the model is acceptable. 
var15ect: Variance in Corporate Income Tax Rate between 1997 and 2011 
There is a negative relationship between the variance in corporate income tax rate over the 
fifteen year period. This is in line with the advice of Mr Rui Palma of Linklaters who 
suggested that companies want to be able to trust that the tax rates of a country, when they 
open a subsidiary, will remain at the same level in the future. This was further confirmed, in 
the Público when discussing the factors outside of corporate income tax rate that were 
important to investors when choosing a location.
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Luxembourg is an excellent example of stability and this is evident in their approach towards 
changing their corporate income tax rates. Except for a drop of 7% in 2002, Luxembourg 
never adjusted its corporate income tax rate by more than 1% from year to year. This gave an 
impression of stability because changes were small and investors were never shocked by a 
huge overhaul of the corporate income tax rate.  
The significance of the variance on the corporate income tax rate over the past fifteen years 
demonstrates that, within the group of countries where Portuguese companies have financial 
subsidiaries, those with more stable tax rates, have a higher likelihood of having a further 
Portuguese company subsidiary located there. The coefficient of -1.84 demonstrates that a 1 
unit increase in variability of the corporate income tax between 1997 and 2011, results in a 
1.84 unit decrease in the likelihood of a Portuguese company locating a subsidiary in that 
country.  
When comparing only those countries that already have subsidiaries located in them, the 
variable acts as expected in Hypothesis 1. It is also interesting to note that in this case, the 
variability is significant over the full time period between 1997 and 2011. Thus, even taking 
into account the increasingly competitive nature of corporate income tax rates in recent years, 
Portuguese companies still value the stability and reliability of a corporate income tax rate. 
This variable is significant at the 5% level. 
dta: Existence of Double Taxation Agreement between Portugal and that country 
(dummy 1;0) 
There is a negative relationship between the existence of a DTA between Portugal and that 
country which is unexpected. 
Personal experience during the internship has demonstrated the importance of the DTA 
network for each country. The United Kingdom, through the office of HM Revenue and 
Customs, is continually in negotiations with those countries which they do not yet have a 
DTA with and feel that it would be a valuable addition to their network. They clearly see 
value in the existence of a DTA for increasing FDI flows between countries. 
This variable is significant at a 1% level. 
Recommendations for UKTI 
The following recommendations have arisen from a combination of advice from Mr Moreira 
and Mr Palma, results of the regressions and discussions with UKTI. 
The stability of the corporate income tax rate is clearly important to Portuguese investors 
when deciding where to locate a financial subsidiary. The United Kingdom is currently in the 
process of lowering their tax rate
xxvi
 on a yearly basis in order to become more competitive 
with other jurisdictions such as Ireland. Thus, UKTI needs to make it very clear to 
Portuguese investors that although these changes are occurring, it is being done for their 
benefit and they need not be concerned that the form of taxation will remain unpredictable. 
UKTI could familiarise potential investors with the long-term plan for lowering corporate 
income tax rates (CIT will be 23% in 2013 and 22% in 2014) so that they know what to 
expect and see the benefit for them. This should assuage their strong aversion to uncertainty. 
The UK is ranked fifth in direct investment in Portugal.
xxvii
 This fact could be used to 
encourage Portuguese investors to feel confident about opening a financial subsidiary in the 
UK because there are bilateral benefits. The presence of UK companies in Portugal would 
also benefit Portuguese investors from a networking point. The Collectivist nature of Portugal 
means that there is value placed on leveraging the network around you which is an obstacle 
when locating a financial subsidiary in a new country. UKTI could encourage the forming of 
relationships with those UK companies which are present in Portugal to build the confidence 
of Portuguese investors when going to the UK. 
There is a Double Taxation Treaty in existence between Portugal and the United Kingdom, 
however the currency difference could cause unpredictable costs with respect to exchange 
rates
xxviii
. UKTI needs to ensure that Portuguese investors see the pound sterling (£) as a 
stable alternative to the euro (€) which is currently under much scrutiny due to the economic 
crisis. In this way, the negative aspect of unpredictable exchange rates is mitigated by the 
benefit of having profits in a different currency. This attempt to limit the perception of 
unpredictability also aims to manage the strong cultural value of risk aversion. 
A further benefit that UKTI should emphasize is the ease and flexibility of British processes 
for opening and closing companies. The UK is also open to foreign investment and thus, 
Portuguese investors would find few bureaucratic obstacles for the opening of their financial 
subsidiary in the UK. 
Conclusion 
As we can see, the results discussed above confirm the Expresso article
xxix
 that says that 
lowering tax rates help to capture investment but are not everything. Other factors, besides 
the corporate income tax rate, were also found to be significant and indicated that the ‘bigger 
picture’ of a country’s offering is what truly matters to potential investors. This is true for 
both traditional determinants of FDI and other considerations which have since arisen. 
Both regressions demonstrated that the stability of the corporate income tax rate in a country 
was relevant to the decision-making process of a Portuguese company when deciding on a 
location for a financial subsidiary. This was found both when the company was deciding 
whether or not to locate in a specific country and also when comparing those countries which 
already had financial subsidiaries located in them.  
When deciding whether or not to locate in a country, the general position of that country was 
relevant to the Portuguese investors. The significant variables of economic risk and average 
GDP per capita are both variables which would indicate the state of a potential host country 
in general economic terms.  
However, the more detailed issues became prominent when comparing those countries which 
did have a subsidiary located in them. The existence of a Double Taxation agreement was 
significant which illustrates the competitive nature of attracting inward investment and the 
need to use every avenue to give the best possible offer to potential investors. 
None of the cultural values were found to be significant in either of the regressions. However, 
when analysing those variables that were significant, it is possible to attribute some of the 
causes to Portugal’s cultural values. For example, the significance of the corporate income 
tax variability over the past fifteen years could be linked to the strong Portuguese cultural 
value of uncertainty avoidance. The need for stability over the full fifteen years demonstrates 
a need to be very certain that the investor could trust that the corporate income tax rate would 
remain close to what they had agreed to when investing in that country. 
Thus, we see that corporate income tax rates are not the only factor which Portuguese 
companies consider when choosing a destination to open a financial subsidiary. 
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